University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Wharton Pension Research Council Working
Papers

Wharton Pension Research Council

3-1-2011

First-Round Impacts of the 2008 Chilean Pension
System Reform
Jere R. Berhman
The School of Arts & Sciences, University of Pennsylvania, jbehrman@econ.upenn.edu

Maria Cecilia Calderon
Population Council, mcalderon@popcouncil.org

Olivia S. Mitchell
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, mitchelo@wharton.upenn.edu

Javiera Vasquez
Universidad de Chile, Javiera.vasquez@gmail.com

David Bravo
Universidad de Chile, dbravo@econ.facea.uchile.cl

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers
Part of the Economics Commons
Berhman, Jere R.; Calderon, Maria Cecilia; Mitchell, Olivia S.; Vasquez, Javiera; and Bravo, David, "First-Round Impacts of the 2008
Chilean Pension System Reform" (2011). Wharton Pension Research Council Working Papers. 167.
https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/167

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/167
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

First-Round Impacts of the 2008 Chilean Pension System Reform
Abstract

Chile’s innovative privatized pension system has been lauded as possible model for Social Security system
overhauls in other countries, yet it has also been critiqued for not including a strong safety net for the
uncovered sector. In response, the Bachelet government in 2008 implemented reforms to rectify this
shortcoming. Here we offer the first systematic effort to directly evaluate the reform’s impacts, focusing on the
new Basic Solidarity Pension for poor households with at least one person age 65+. Using the Social
Protection Survey, we show that targeted poor households received about 2.4 percent more household annual
income, with little evidence of crowding-out of private transfers. We also suggest that recipient household
welfare probably increased due to slightly higher expenditures on basic consumption including healthcare,
more leisure hours, and improved self-reported health. While measured short-run effects are small, follow-ups
will be essential to gauge longer-run outcomes.
Disciplines

Economics

This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/167

First-Round Impacts
of the 2008 Chilean Pension System Reform
Jere R. Behrman, Maria Cecilia Calderon, Olivia S. Mitchell,
Javiera Vasquez, and David Bravo

March 2011

PRC WP2011-03
Pension Research Council Working Paper
Pension Research Council
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
3620 Locust Walk, 3000 SH-DH
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6302
Tel: 215.898.7620 Fax: 215.573.3418
Email: prc@wharton.upenn.edu
http://www.pensionresearchcouncil.org

The authors acknowledge support provided by the Pension Research Council and Boettner Center at the Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania; the National Institutes of Health/National Institute of Aging (NIA) grant
AG023774-01(P.I. Petra Todd) on “Lifecycle health, work, aging, insurance and pensions in Chile;” and the Social
Security Administration via a grant from the Michigan Retirement Research Center. Opinions and errors are solely
those of the authors and not of the institutions providing funding for this study or with which the authors are
affiliated. ©2011 Pension Research Council. All rights reserved.

First-Round Impacts
of the 2008 Chilean Pension System Reform
Abstract
Chile’s innovative privatized pension system has been lauded as possible model for Social
Security system overhauls in other countries, yet it has also been critiqued for not including a
strong safety net for the uncovered sector. In response, the Bachelet government in 2008
implemented reforms to rectify this shortcoming. Here we offer the first systematic effort to
directly evaluate the reform’s impacts, focusing on the new Basic Solidarity Pension for poor
households with at least one person age 65+. Using the Social Protection Survey, we show that
targeted poor households received about 2.4 percent more household annual income, with little
evidence of crowding-out of private transfers. We also suggest that recipient household welfare
probably increased due to slightly higher expenditures on basic consumption including
healthcare, more leisure hours, and improved self-reported health. While measured short-run
effects are small, follow-ups will be essential to gauge longer-run outcomes.
Jere R. Behrman
Dept. of Economics and Sociology, School of Arts and Sciences
University of Pennsylvania, 3718 Locust Walk, 160 McNeil
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297, USA
jbehrman@econ.upenn.edu
Maria Cecilia Calderon
Population Council
One Dag Hammarskjold Plaza, 9th Floor
New York, NY, 10017, USA
mcalderon@popcouncil.org
Olivia S. Mitchell
Dept. of Insurance and Risk Management, Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust Walk, 3000 SH-DH
Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
mitchelo@wharton.upenn.edu
Javiera Vasquez
Centro de Microdatos
Universidad de Chile, Diag Paraguay #257, Torre 26
Santiago, Chile
Javiera.vasquez@gmail.com
David Bravo
Director, Centro de Microdatos
Universidad de Chile, Diag Paraguay #257, Torre 26
Santiago, Chile
dbravo@econ.facea.uchile.cl

1

First-Round Impacts
of the 2008 Chilean Pension System Reform
Jere R. Behrman, Maria Cecilia Calderon, Olivia S. Mitchell,
Javiera Vasquez and David Bravo

Systematic research on the effects of alternative pension systems is useful to enhance the
scientific basis for policy evaluation in the retirement arena. One of the most interesting, perhaps
the most interesting, country in this regard has been Chile, which since 1981 has become a
laboratory for observing the impacts of pension privatization. Specifically, for 30 years Chile has
had mandatory individual retirement accounts managed by private-sector providers known as
Pension Fund Managers (AFPs, Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones). Formal-sector
workers are required to save an annual 10 percent of their pay in their accounts, which offer
some investment choice, and wherein they must preserve the funds until they reach retirement
age.
Though the Chilean AFP system has numerous strengths, it has also been cited for paying
low benefit levels and for having low rates of worker contributions (Berstein et al. 2006; Gill et
al. 2005; Kritzer et al. 2011). Accordingly, in July 2008, the government of President Michelle
Bachelet initiated several system-wide reforms intended to strengthen the national safety net for
both the young and the old (Diaz et al. 2009). This paper evaluates how one key element of the
2008 Chilean reform, namely the Basic Solidarity Pension (PBS, Pension Básica Solidaria),
influenced economic outcomes for targeted poor households with at least one member age 65 or
older. We do so using the 2006 and 2009 Chilean Social Protection Surveys (EPS, Encuesta de
Proteccion Social) and linked information from administrative data about the respondents to
investigate resulting changes in knowledge of and receipt of these new transfers as well as
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changes in outcomes such as household work and health status and expenditures on alcohol and
cigarette consumption, health insurance, and ownership of consumer durables. 1 We address a
wide range of outcomes because we posit that, as in standard economic household models, the
reforms may have influenced behaviors in unanticipated or even undesirable ways from the
policy perspective. Results indicate that targeted households with elderly individuals received
about 2.4 percent more household annual income, with little evidence of crowding-out private
transfers. We also suggest that recipient household welfare probably increased due to slightly
higher expenditures on basic consumption including healthcare, more leisure hours, and
improved self-reported health. While measured short-run effects are small, follow-ups will be
essential to gauge longer-run behaviors.

Background
Chile’s privately managed pension system has inspired reform in many other countries
and is considered by some as a possible prototype for reform in the United States and elsewhere
(Arenas de Mesa 2005; Arenas de Mesa et al. 2007; and Barr and Diamond, 2008). Accordingly,
in 2008 when the government launched a series of reforms, this aroused substantial international
interest (Arenas de Mesa 2010; Kritzer 2008; Packard 2002; and Valdes-Prieto 2009). These
changes were driven in part by the fact that many workers did not contribute much to the system;
also benefit levels were projected to be low for those who failed to contribute at least 20 years
and hence would be ineligible for a guaranteed minimum pension benefit.
The new safety net as implemented includes two big components: a) the Basic Solidarity
Pension (PBS, Pension Básica Solidaria) mentioned above, that secures a minimum meanstested benefit for the elderly poor (age 65+) who do not satisfy minimum contribution
1

For further discussion of the EPS see Bravo et al. (2004, 2006) and Centro de Microdatos (2009).
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requirements, and b) a pension top-up (APS, Aporte Previsional Solidario) that increases pension
benefits for those who did contribute to the AFP system. In 2008, the PBS was set at
US$105/month or about one-third of the minimum monthly wage of US$333, higher than the
Minimum Pension Guarantee of US$187/month (Kritzer 2008). The PBS benefit withdrawal rate
is 100 percent for households with income above the governmental poverty threshold (ValdesPrieto 2009). The PBS was initially targeted at the poorest 40 percent of the population; coverage
is set to rise gradually to 60 percent by 2012. 2 In what follows, we use difference-in-difference
analysis to examine the short-run impacts of the PBS targeted towards poor households with at
least one member age 65+. 3
Old-Age ‘Basic Solidarity Pension’: the old-age Basic Solidarity Pension is a monthly benefit
paid by the Chilean Government to those who (a) receive no other pension, (b) are age 65+, and
(c) are deemed to be in the poorest half of the population according to their poverty score
(measured as a “Ficha de Proteccion Social” score of 12,666 points or below). 4 This benefit has
been rolling-out gradually since July 2008 because it represents a large boost in poverty
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Several other reforms were also instituted though they are not the focus here. The self-employed are now to be
required to contribute to the individual accounts system with a phase-in; in 2012, their contribution rate will be 10
percent on 40 percent of their pay, and by 2015, their entire pay will be subject to the 10 percent contribution rate.
Additionally, low-wage workers (those earning less than 1.5 times the minimum wage) are to receive a contribution
subsidy by employers and the government. Survivor and disability insurance is being extended to working men and
women to age 65 (before, women were covered only to age 60), and since women average lower disability rates,
they will receive a refund of the excess charges into their individual account pensions. A benefit subsidy is to be
paid to mothers age 65 or above who retire from 2009 on and who contributed at least once to an AFP and are in
receipt of a solidarity or survivors pension. This benefit is computed as a per-child bond that earns a return from
each child’s birthdate until the mother reaches age 65. Finally, assets accumulated in workers’ individual accounts
are now divisible on divorce (which was only recently legalized in Chile), and both widows and widowers are now
eligible for survivor pensions (previously only widows received the survivor benefit).
3
More time must pass to measure the medium and longer-run impacts of the 2008 provisions. An alternative
approach to that used in this paper would be to develop and estimate a structural life cycle model that could be used
to stimulate counterfactuals under the pension reforms of 2008. A few authors have developed such formulations,
but they have not used them to study the 2008 reform (Joubert 2010; Vélez-Grajales 2009).
4
During the first two years 2008-2010, the FPS score was used to assign the PBS benefit; however, since July 2010
the law establishes the use of a new tool called Puntaje de Focalizacion Previsional (PFP). This new instrument
uses the same information captured by the FPS score but in a different way; giving relevance to the information that
appears more related to the pension situation. A PFP score of 1,100 or lower was required for the period between
July 2010 and June 2011 to be eligible for the PBS benefit.
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payments. At that time, the benefit was worth US$105/month and the program aimed to reach
the poorest 40 percent of the population. By July 2009, the amount had risen to US$132/month,
and coverage was targeted to the poorest 45 percent of the population; the coverage target rose to
50 percent by September 2009, 55 percent by July 2010 and 60 percent as of July 2011, a year
before the planned schedule. 5 Benefits are paid both by the government Social Security
administration (IPS, Instituto de Previsión Social, formerly the INP), local municipalities, and
the AFPs. To date, the IPS is the main distributor with half a million applications, whereas the
AFPs have registered only about 30,000 applications.

Data Overview
To analyze the near-term impact of the reform we rely on the EPS, which is a panel
survey collected by the Microdata Center of the Universidad de Chile with guidance from a
University of Pennsylvania research team. 6 The sample is drawn from a frame of approximately
8.1 million current and former affiliates of the Chilean old-age systems compiled from
administrative sources. For this study, we focus on a research file of 10,394 individuals for
whom all key dependent variables are available from both the 2006 and 2009 EPSs 7 to ensure
that the multiple outcomes traced over time track changes in responses rather than changes in
sample coverage. 8

5

http://www.safp.cl/573/article-5785.html
Research support was provided by a U.S. National Institutes of Aging (NIA) grant on which three senior coauthors are Co-Investigators to supplement resources provided by the Chilean government.
7
The total number of respondents was 16,443 in the 2006 EPS and 14,243 in the 2009 EPS. For some dependent
variables, sample sizes are smaller. For instance, hours worked are available only for those in the labor force and
who report hours worked (5,980 individuals); per capita household expenditures on clothing are available for 10,099
observations; per capita household medical expenditures are available for 9,735; and purchases of private medical
insurance are available for 9,737 persons; and for a set of a dozen consumer durables we have between 10,388 and
10,394 responses.
8
We also note below that results are similar if we consider the largest possible sample for each dependent variable
rather than the sample available for all outcomes.
6
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Descriptive statistics for demographic and other factors appear in Table 1. Respondents’
average age is 49.7 years (sd=14.9) and average schooling attainment is 9.8 grades (sd=4.3),
reflective of the fact that Chile has a relatively highly-schooled population for a developing
country. The sample is almost half male (48.5 percent), and mean household size is 3.9 members
(sd=1.9). Almost a third (32 percent) of the households report having a member age 65+. The
mean age of the household head is older, at 53.8 years (sd=14.6), and schooling attainment
slightly lower, at 9.3 grades (sd=4.4), compared to all EPS respondents. But where there is a
large difference between respondents and household heads is with respect to sex, with about
three-quarters (72.9 percent) of household heads being male. Mean annual household income
(expressed in constant 2009 terms) is US$9,650 (sd=US$14,100), which implies a mean per
capita annual household income of US$2,990 (sd=US$4,475). 9 Finally, over half (52.7 percent)
of the households have Ficha de Proteccion Social (FPS) scores below the poverty cutoff used to
establish eligibility for the reform’s means test. 10 The FPS score was provided from
administrative data matched to the EPS respondents, so the FPS values used in the multivariate
analysis below are the official scores and not self-reported.
Table 1 here
To examine the first-round impact of the reform, we examine three sets of outcomes. The
first set, shown in Table 2, includes seven variables related to respondent knowledge of the
reform and reports of PASIS/PBS 11 benefit receipt in 2009. 12 Only about one-quarter (25.9

9

In 2009, the exchange rate between Chilean pesos (CLP) and the US dollar was 569.37 (CIA World Factbook,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ci.html, accessed 28 August 2010). Household
income is missing for one-fifth of the households.
10
Some 15.1 percent have FPS scores above the eligibility cutoff, about 31.1 percent have no FPS scores and we
lack of information for whether or not 1.1 percent of households have a score. A natural interpretation is that
respondents lacking an FPS scores were likely ineligible.
11
Before the reform was implemented in July 2008, some in the targeted population received the PASIS benefit
which refers to the former Assistance Pension (Pension Asistencial). After the reform, this group received the higher
PBS (paid to individuals 18 years or older who were PASIS beneficiaries prior to the reform who became PBS
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percent) of the respondents indicated that they had heard of the pension reform, though more
(35.3 percent) said they had heard of the PBS for the elderly and 8.6 percent of the top up (APS)
for the elderly. Very few (3.7 percent) said they had received the pre-2008 reform support
payment (PASIS) as of June 2008, and about the same fraction (3.6 percent) claimed to be
receiving the PBS support as of 2009. Very few, only 6.6 percent, knew that the PBS and APS
benefits began in July 2008, and only 12.5 percent knew that the PBS and APS benefits cover the
poorest 40-60 percent of the population (with the percentage increasing over time). In summary,
very few respondents seemed particularly knowledgeable about the 2008 pension reform though
knowledge about the PBS component was more widespread.
Table 2 here
A second set of outcomes, described in Table 3, refers to transfers received by
households in 2006 and 2009, as well as the difference between these two years. These transfers
(in constant 2009 US$) are: (a) PASIS/PBS pension payments, (b) the sum of all public transfers
received, and (c) all private transfers received. 13 In 2006, the reported average total public
transfers and private transfers both totaled around US$152, though with much greater variation
for private transfers received (sd=US$1,332) than for public transfers received (sd=US$484).
PASIS/PBS accounted for about two-thirds (65 percent in 2006 and 66 percent in 2009) of the
reported public transfers. Between 2006 and 2009, public transfers rose considerably: the
average increased by half to US$236 for overall reported public transfers and by 60 percent to
US$157 for PASIS/PBS. At the same time, mean private transfers declined by 12 percent though
beneficiaries automatically as of July 2008). For this reason, when we compare 2006 and 2009 data, we refer to both
groups.
12
An analysis of pension knowledge using earlier EPS surveys is provided in Behrman et al. (2010).
13
The sum for all public transfers received includes, in addition to the PASIS/PBS pension payment, the family
allowance, the Subsidio Unico Familiar (SUF, for recent births, pregnant women, mothers, mental deficiencies, and
invalids) and other public subsidies. For PASIS/PBS and for total public transfers both the reported amounts and the
corrected amounts (given the actual schedules) were investigated, but none of the conclusions differ importantly
between these two alternatives.
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the change was not significant. Thus, public transfers appear to have risen between 2006 and
2009, coincident with the pension reform of July 2008. There is also some suggestion of the
possibility of private transfers being crowded-out. Overall, reported public transfers equaled 2.4
percent of mean reported income in 2009, while the PASIS/PBS alone accounted for 1.6 percent
and private transfers received accounted for 1.4 percent.
Table 3 here
A third set of outcomes includes economic and social behaviors such as hours worked,
household expenditures, alcohol and cigarette consumption, health insurance, self-reported
health status, and ownership of consumer durables. The picture is quite mixed here, since
between 2006 and 2009, mean household ownership increased significantly for 9 of the 12
consumer durables considered (the significant decline for landline telephones is offset by the
large rise in cellphones). On the other hand, mean household per capita food expenditure
declined significantly by 4 percent; cigarette consumption held steady but reported alcohol
consumption fell by 15 percent; household per capita clothing expenditures increased
significantly by 18 percent; and household per capita educational and medicine expenditures
remained the same. Respondents’ mean participation in private health insurance decreased
significantly by 7 percent and self-reported health status declined significantly by 2 percent. For
those employed, mean hours worked remained at about 45 hours per week.
Table 4 here

Multivariate Analysis of 2008 PBS Reform Impacts on Targeted Poor Households with at
Least One Member Age 65+
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Using the 2006 and 2009 EPSs, we next measure the “intent-to-treat” impacts of the PBS
component of the 2008 Pension Reform on targeted poor households with at least one member
age 65+. Our estimation strategy for transfers received and behavioral outcomes exploits
reported changes between 2006 and 2009, along with discontinuities in the applicability of
certain provisions of the reform related to the age of household members and the FPS score. We
also control for observed characteristics unaffected by the program in triple-difference estimates
(because there are two eligibility criteria plus the time difference between 2006 and 2009). For
example, to investigate how the PBS transfer influenced an outcome Yt for targeted households,
we estimate the following model:
Yit=β0+β1Age65ht + β2Poorht +β3Timet+β4Age65ht*Poorht
+β5Age65ht*Timet+β6Poorht*Timet +β7Age65ht*Poorht*Timet+ β8Controlsit +vit, ,
where the subscript i refers to the unit of observation for the dependent variable which may be
either the individual respondent or the household depending on the outcome variable; the
subscript h refers to the household because some of the right-side variables are household-level
variables even if the dependent variable is an individual-level variable (in particular Age65 and
Poor); the subscript t refers to the time period; Age65=1 if the household satisfies the age
criterion for PBS eligibility (e.g. it has at least one individual age 65+) and zero otherwise; Poor
= 1 if the household has a “Ficha de Proteccion Social” score below the cutoff and zero
otherwise; 14 and Time = 1 for 2009 (after the introduction of the Reform in 2008) and zero
otherwise. We also include a vector of characteristics (controls) unaffected by the program (e.g.,
for the household head and respondent depending on whether the dependent variable is
household-level or respondent-level, sex and a quadratic in age to control for possible life-cycle
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In our empirical implementation we have a measure of Poor only for 2009 so effectively the time subscript for
this variable is suppressed.
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patterns) and a stochastic random disturbance term v. Our estimate of β7 measures the “intent-totreat” impact of the PBS component of the 2008 reform on the dependent variable of interest in
2009 for targeted poor households with at least one household member age 65+ who meet the
age and poverty requirements to receive the PBS, holding constant observed household variables
(and through the triple-difference procedure, unobserved fixed household characteristics).
Only the 2009 wave contains relevant information for the knowledge of the 2009 pension
reform and reported receipt of PASIS/PBS transfers. Accordingly, we generate double-difference
estimates using only the 2009 data; that is, in the equation above, all terms involving Timet are
constrained to zero (i.e., β3=β5=β6=β7=0) and the estimate of β4 reflects the impact of the PBS
reform on key outcomes. Again we control for observed household/respondent variables and,
through the double-difference procedure, unobserved fixed household/respondent characteristics.
Table 5 summarizes findings for the pension reform knowledge and reports of
PASIS/PBS transfers. Five of the dependent variables are dichotomous (0 = no; 1 = yes), so
probit estimates are presented for these variables. Two others are trichotomous (0 = incorrect; 1
= do not know; 2 = correct), so we use multinomial probits for these (Table 5 presents marginal
effects). Of key interest is the fact that the linear term for having someone age 65+ in the
household is statistically significant in only one of the seven outcomes: respondents are
significantly more likely to say they receive the PBS at the time of the 2009 survey if there is a
household member age 65+. The linear term for being poor is statistically significant for five of
the seven dependent variables; it is negative for having heard of the pension reform, having
heard of the PBS for the elderly, having heard of the APS for the elderly, and not knowing15
when the pension reform began. It is positive for having received the PASIS and having received
the PBS. Thus, ceteris paribus, the poor are less-well informed than the non-poor but more likely
15

That is, responding they “do not know,” as opposed to responding wrongly or correctly.
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to report receiving the PASIS/PBS targeted transfers. Of most interest are the interaction terms
between having a person age 65 or older in the household and being poor. Among the seven
dependent variables examined, only the one for having heard of the PBS for the elderly has a
positive significant coefficient estimate.
Table 5 here
Next we turn to household transfers received, summarized in Table 6. Now the linear
terms and double interactions for having someone age 65+ in the household, the year 2009, and
the household being poor, are all positive and significant for all of the public transfers, as well as
for the PASIS/PBS (with a single exception of the year 2009 variable for the latter). By contrast,
none of these is significant for receiving private transfers. The coefficient estimate of primary
interest, of course, is the triple interaction because this estimate gives the estimated average
impact of the 2008 reform on 2009 outcomes for poor households having someone age 65 or
older. These estimates are significantly positive and substantial for PASIS/PBS (US$105 per
year) and for total public transfers received (US$107 per year). The estimate is not statistically
significant for private transfers received, so there is little evidence of crowding-out of private
transfers by larger public transfers.
Table 6 here
Next we turn to estimated triple-difference impacts on household behaviors. Table 7
reports estimates on four types of per capita household expenditures (food, clothing, education,
medicine) and five respondent behaviors (cigarette consumption, alcohol consumption, private
health insurance purchases, self-rated health status and weekly hours worked), while Table 8
reports estimates for a dozen purchases of consumer durables/services (TV, refrigerator, washing
machine, oven, hot water heater, landline phone, cell phone, DVD, microwave, computer,
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internet connection, and cable TV). For these estimates, the linear coefficient for having a
household member age 65+ is significantly negative for household per capita clothing
expenditures, household per capita educational expenditures, and household ownership of cell
phones, DVDs, computers, and internet connections. In contrast, the estimates are significantly
positive for the number of TVs and landline phones, as well as for the highest categories in
respondent self-rated health. The linear associations with the year 2009 are significantly negative
with household per capita food expenditures, respondent alcohol consumption, and household
ownership of landline phones and ovens, and significantly positive for per capita clothing
expenditures and ownership of washing machines, hot water heaters, cell phones, DVDs,
microwaves, computers, internet connections and TV cable. The linear associations with being
poor are significantly negative for per capita food, clothing and educational expenditures,
cigarettes and alcohol consumption, private health insurance, the highest categories in selfrelated health, hours worked per week, and household ownership of eleven consumer durables
(the exception is ownership of ovens). Accordingly these results are fairly plausible a priori.
There also are a number of significant double interactions (27 percent of the 63 possibilities)
summarized in Table 9, about 65 percent of which ameliorate the negative associations of being
poor for households with a member age 65+ in 2009.
Tables 7, 8, and 9 here
For the purpose of evaluating the short-run impact of the reform, the key coefficient
estimates are those of the triple-difference terms which are positive for three of the four
household expenditure categories: cigarette consumption; private insurance, and the three highest
categories in self-reported health status; as well as five of the consumer durable purchase
amounts. They are negative in other cases with perhaps the most interesting being the fairly large

12

reduction of 1.6 work hours per week. Thus, there is some suggestion that the PBS impact on
targeted households may have been to boost expenditures on basic household consumption
including on health, enhance respondent leisure by reducing hours worked, and improve
respondent self-reported health, with mixed effects on respondent cigarette versus alcohol intake
and on the composition of consumer durables. This pattern could be interpreted to be somewhat
welfare-enhancing for the targeted poor households having an older member in 2009.
Nevertheless, two important qualifications must be noted. First, with the exception of the
increase in leisure through hours worked reductions, estimated effects are not quantitatively
large. For instance, our estimated increase in annual expenditures on food, clothing, and
medicine, represent only an annual US$13, US$1 and US$16, respectively. Second these
estimates are not significantly different from zero at the standard 5 percent level; the two most
significant coefficient estimates are for (a) respondent self-reported health status (significantly
nonzero at the 10 percent level) and (b) hours worked per week (significantly nonzero at the 15
percent level).

Conclusions
Our study is the first systematic effort to directly evaluate the short-run impacts of
Chile’s pension reform of 2008. We focus on a key component, the Basic Solidarity Pension or
PBS for the elderly, directed towards poor households with at least one person age 65+. We find
that, in 2009, the poor were less-well informed about the reform than the non-poor, but they were
nevertheless more likely to report receiving the PASIS/PBS transfers targeted on the poor. One
significant program impact is that respondents living in a poor household with someone age 65+
are more likely than others to have heard of the PBS for the elderly. We find a significant
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positive impact of the reform among the targeted poor having an older household member where
respondents indicate receiving an annual US$105from PASIS/PBS transfers. There is little
evidence of public benefits crowding-out private transfers. There is also some suggestion that the
targeted transfers led households to boost expenditures on health, increase leisure, and improve
self-reported health, with mixed effects on cigarette versus alcohol intake and on the composition
of consumer durables.
This pattern might seem to be somewhat welfare-enhancing for poor households with at
least one older member in 2009. Nevertheless, such a conclusion must be heavily qualified
because, with the exception of the reduction in work hours of 1.6 hours per week, the estimated
effects are small and none of the underlying coefficient estimates are significantly nonzero at the
standard 5 percent level. These insignificant and generally small effects raise questions about
what happened to the reported increased income from the increased PASIS/PBS as well as
questions about how these impact patterns will evolve. Part of the answer, despite the impression
of the estimates, may be in crowding-out private transfers received and inducing reductions in
work. As has been noted elsewhere (e.g., Behrman and King 2008; King and Behrman 2009),
there also are a number of reasons to expect adjustments over time in implementation of reforms
and in private responses to those reforms. 16 Therefore, it will be very important, in the future, to
monitor and evaluate the time pattern of a broad array of responses to the components of the
Reform introduced in 2008, as well as to the components of the Reform being phased in over
time.

16

A related observation in term often used in the ‘impact evaluation’ literature is that we are estimating “intent to
treat” effects. But if there are implementation delays, the “intent to treat” group may be much larger than the
“treatment of the treated” group, initially, even if eventually they become approximately the same over time.

14
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Controls and Selected Other Variables
Mean

Sd. Dev.

Schooling attainment (grade)

9.8

4.3

Age (years)

49.7

14.9

Male (%)

48.5

Respondent Characteristics

Household Characteristics
Number of members

3.9

1.9

One or more member >= 65 years (%)

32.0

HH head schooling attainment (grades)

9.3

4.4

HH head age (years)

53.8

14.6

HH head male (%)

72.9

Income (2009 USD)

9,657

14,087

Income per capita (2009 USD)

2,994

4,475

Income missing (%)

21.2

Poor based on FPS score (%)

52.7

Notes: N = 10,394 except for household income and household income per
capita for which cases N = 8,195. FPS stands for Ficha de Proteccion Social .
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for 2009 Knowledge of the Pension Reform and Reporting Receiving PASIS/PBS Transfers

Have you heard
about the Pension
Reform?

Do you know or have
you heard about the
Basic Pension
System (PBS) for
the Elderly?

Do you know or have
you heard of the
Pension
Contribution
System (APS) for
the Elderly?

By June 2008,
Were you a
beneficiary of the
Support Pension
PASIS?

Currently, are you
receiving the Basic
Pension System
(PBS)?

No (% )

74.1

64.75

91.42

96.31

96.44

Yes (% )

25.9

35.25

8.58

3.69

3.56

Total

100

100

100

100

100

Since when do you think the people will
receive the benefits of the Basic Pension
System (PBS) and the Pension
Contribution System (APS)? /a

What percentage of the population in the
country do you believe will receive the
benefits of the Basic Pension System
(PBS) and Pension Contribution System
(APS)? /b

Incorrect (% )

20.69

21.4

DNK / NR (% )

72.72

66.12

6.6

12.49

100

100

Correct (% )
Total
/a

Notes: N = 10,394. correct = July 2008;

/b

correct = 40-60%.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Selected Annual Transfers Received by Households (in 2009 US$)
Mean

Sd. Dev.

% HHs that
receive the
transfer

Mean

2006

Sd. Dev.

% HHs that
receive the
transfer

2009

Difference in means
2009 - 2006

p-value

Total public transfers received

151.8

483.6

28.8

235.8

603.2

35.5

84.1

0.000

PASIS/PBS transfer

98.1

457.4

7.0

156.6

571.1

9.7

58.5

0.000

Total private transfers received

151.7

1,332.2

7.3

133.6

1,127.7

6.8

-18.0

0.292

Note: N = 10,394 each year.
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Household and Respondent Behavioral Outcomes
2006

2009

Difference in Means

Mean

Sd. Dev.

Mean

Sd. Dev.

2009 - 2006

p-value

Food

741

867

711

550

-29

0.004

Annual household expenditures per capita (constant 2009 USD)
Education

341

916

328

875

-14

0.266

Clothing

85

267

100

179

15

0.000

Medicine

87

932

89

916

2

0.863

TV

1.83

1.05

1.88

1.02

0.05

0.000

Refrigerator

0.96

0.36

0.97

0.32

0.00

0.509

Washing machine

0.74

0.47

0.79

0.43

0.06

0.000

Household consumer durables and services (number)

Oven

1.01

0.25

1.00

0.22

-0.01

0.000

Hot water heater

0.67

0.51

0.69

0.51

0.02

0.013

Landline phone

0.55

0.58

0.53

0.57

-0.03

0.001

Cell phone

1.46

1.36

1.68

1.32

0.22

0.000

DVD

0.71

0.69

0.74

0.68

0.03

0.001

Microwave

0.47

0.51

0.53

0.52

0.06

0.000

Computer

0.38

0.58

0.50

0.66

0.12

0.000

Internet connection

0.17

0.39

0.28

0.48

0.11

0.000

Cable TV

0.25

0.46

0.38

0.51

0.13

0.000

Number of cigarettes smoked per month

47.0

116.6

47.4

120.3

0.5

0.778

Number of glasses of alcohol consumed per week

2.3

5.3

2.0

4.7

-0.4

0.000

Respondent

Health insurance is private (%)

13

-1

0.048

Self-reported health status (1=very bad; 6=excellent)

3.7

1.0

3.7

12
0.9

-0.1

0.000

Hours worked (weekly)

45.1

13.2

44.8

13.1

-0.4

0.141

Note: N=10,394 each year except: data on per capita household expenditures on clothing N= 10,099; per capita household medicine expenditures N=9,735;
purchasing private medical insurance N= 9,737; hours worked N = 5,980; and for the 12 consumer durables and services N ranges from 10,388 to 10,394.
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Table 5. Knowledge of the Pension Reform and Reporting Receiving PASIS/PBS Transfers - Marginal effects

Have you
heard about
the pension
reform?

By June
Do you know Do you know
Currently,
or have you
2008, Were
or have you
are you
you a
heard about heard of the
receiving the
Pension
beneficiary of
the Basic
Basic
Contribution the Support
Pension
Pension
System for
Pension
System for
System?
PASIS?
the Elderly? the Elderly?

Since when do you think the people will
receive the benefits of the Basic Pension
System and the Pension Contribution
System?

probit

What percentage of the population in the
country do you believe will apply the
benefits of the Basic Pension System and
Pension Contribution System?

multinomial probit

0 = no; 1 = yes

outcome =
incorrect

outcome =
DNK / NR

outcome =
correct

outcome =
incorrect

outcome =
DNK / NR

outcome =
correct

Linear terms
HH member >= age 65
Poor

0.023

0.016

-0.002

0.011

0.029*

0.011

-0.038

0.027

0.029

-0.030

0.001

-0.081***

-0.063***

-0.023*

0.021***

0.026**

-0.029*

0.030

-0.001

-0.020

0.021

-0.002

-0.012

.0624381*

0.007

0.008

-0.004

0.004

0.007

-0.011

-0.030

0.025

0.004

Double interactions
Poor * HH member >= age 65
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Notes: N = 10,394; additional dummies included but not reported are: 1 if household did not apply for poverty score, 1 if do not know if household applied for poverty score and two interactions between
the previous two variables and HH member >= 65y. Reference category is non-poor (poverty score above the cutoff). Also, respondent's age, age squared and gender included as controls.
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Table 6. Annual Transfers Received by Households in 2009 US$
All Public
Transfers

PASIS/ PBS

All Private
Transfers

HH member >= age 65

52.03**

42.81*

23.44

Year 2009

17.93***

2.87

-9.96

Poor

84.56***

33.77***

17.57

60.99**

67.80**

3.58

113.82***

132.29***

-45.39

45.78**

20.79**

-13.41

106.89**

104.85**

-28.98

Linear terms

Double interactions
HH member >= age 65 * Year 2009
Poor * HH member >= age 65
Poor * Year 2009
Triple interactions
Year 2009 * Poor * HH member >= age 65
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Notes: N = 20,788 (10,394 respondents each year). Reference category is non-poor (poverty
score above the cutoff) + household did not apply for poverty score + do not know if
household applied for poverty score. HH head's age, age squared and gender included as
controls.
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Table 7. Household Annual Expenditures and Respondent Behaviors
Annual Household Per Capita Expenditures
(2009 USD)

Clothing
(OLS)

Medicine
(OLS)

Respondent Behaviors
Health
insurance,
Number
Number
Self-reported health status, ordered probit marginal effects
probit
glasses of
cigarettes
marginal
alcohol per
per month
effects
week
(OLS)
0=public; outcome = outcome = outcome = outcome = outcome = outcome =
(OLS)
1=private
very bad
bad
reasonable
good
very good excellent

Hours
worked
weekly
(OLS)

Food
(OLS)

Education
(OLS)

-10.66

-221.38***

-23.03**

5.66

-3.53

0.24

-0.01

-0.001*

-0.008*

-0.02*

0.014*

0.009*

0.006*

-0.91

-41.20*

-27.81

30.47***

16.25

1.97

-0.39***

-0.001

0.000

0.002

0.004

-0.003

-0.002

-0.001

-0.27

-310.68*** -297.26*** -62.11***

-52.68

-8.13**

-0.42***

-0.18***

0.006***

0.04***

0.088***

-0.065***

-0.041***

-0.029***

-1.1**

-17.48

-0.22

0.05

0.001

0.001

0.006

0.013

-0.010

-0.006

-0.004

0.84

Linear terms
HH member >= age 65
Year 2009
Poor
Double interactions
HH member >= age 65 * Year 2009

-18.27

24.18

-12.56

Poor * HH member >= age 65

6.56

171.39***

24.66**

-3.90

0.49

-0.11

0.035*

0.001

0.004

0.008

-0.006

-0.004

-0.003

0.51

Poor * Year 2009

20.99

21.82

-18.24*

-23.84

-1.53

0.25

-0.012*

0.000

0.000

0.001

-0.001

0.000

0.000

-0.23

13.18

-4.50

0.70

15.85

4.38

-0.01

0.005

-0.001

-0.01

-0.02

0.01

0.01

0.01

-1.62

Triple interactions
Year 2009 * Poor * HH member >= age 65
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Notes: N = 20,788 (10,394 respondents each year) except data on per capita household expenditures on clothing N= 10,099; per capita household medicine expenditures N=9,735; purchasing private medical insurance
N= 9,737; and hours worked N = 5,980. Reference category is non-poor (poverty score above the cutoff) + household did not apply for poverty score + do not know if household applied for poverty score. HH head's
age, age squared and gender included as controls in expenditures regressions and respondent's age, age squared and gender included in behavior regressions.
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Table 8. OLS Estimates for Household Durable
How many of the following devices do you
have in your household?
Linear terms
HH member >= age 65

TV

Refrigerator

Washing
Machine

Oven

Hot Water
Heater

Landline
Phone

Cell Phone

DVD

Microwave

Computer

Internet
Connection

Cable TV

0.081*

0.02

0.01

0.01

0.03

0.049*

-0.307***

-0.068**

-0.01

-0.074***

-0.036*

0.03

0.03

-0.01

0.036***

-0.014**

0.019**

-0.066***

0.130***

0.043**

0.064***

0.152***

0.159***

0.148***

-0.461***

-0.089***

-0.177***

-0.01

-0.276***

-0.294***

-0.463***

-0.2612***

-0.242***

-0.351***

-0.221***

-0.216***

HH member >= age 65 * Year 2009

0.00

-0.01

0.01

0.00

-0.01

0.03

0.114*

0.01

-0.02

-0.064**

-0.036*

-0.042*

Poor * HH member >= age 65

-0.06

0.00

-0.01

-0.01

0.03

0.00

0.116*

0.01

0.02

0.103***

0.071***

0.00

Poor * Year 2009

0.03

0.024**

0.034**

0.00

0.00

0.049***

0.156***

-0.01

0.02

-0.01

-0.056***

-0.01

0.06

0.01

0.00

0.01

-0.01

-0.01

-0.10

0.01

-0.02

-0.01

-0.01

0.00

Year 2009
Poor
Double interactions

Triple interactions
Year 2009 * Poor * HH member >= age 65
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Notes: N ranges from 10,388 to 10,394 respondents each year. Reference category is non-poor (poverty score above the cutoff) + household did not apply for poverty score + do not know if household applied for poverty
score. HH head's age, age squared and gender included as controls.
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Table 9. Signs of Significant Associations of Interactions for Behavioral Outcomes
Interaction between
HH member >= age 65
positive
cell phone

Interaction between

Year 2009
negative

Poor

HH member >= age 65

positive

negative

Interaction between
Poor
positive

Year 2009
negative

computer

clothing

refrigerator

clothing

internet

education

washer

internet

cable TV

cell phone

land phone

private health insurance

computer

cell phone

internet
private health insurance
Note: Based on Tables 7 and 8. Except for private health insurance, these all are household level outcomes.

